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Almost since the beginning of organized violence, mili-
tary forces have had a separate criminal justice system to
maintain the morale and discipline necessary for battle-
field success. In addition to typical criminal offenses, the
system addresses offenses unique to the military environ-
ment (e.g., desertion, disobedience, dereliction of duty,
and disrespect to superiors).
HISTORY OF MILITARY JUSTICE
Military justice in the United States originated with the
Articles of War adopted from the British Army by the
Continental Congress in 1775. Although there were var-
ious updates and amendments to them, the Articles of
War remained in place until after World War II.
World War II saw extensive use of the military
justice system as more than two million courts-martial
were convened. However, widespread dissatisfaction with
their conduct, and especially the paucity of rights
afforded those accused, led to a number of studies and
recommendations that eventually produced the Uniform
Code of Military Justice (UCMJ) in 1951, codified in 10
U.S.C. § 801 et seq.
UNIFORM CODE OF MILITARY JUSTICE (UCMJ)
Congress’s authority to legislate the UCMJ and other
measures relating to the military justice system does not
arise from Article III of the Constitution as does most
of the federal judiciary. Rather, it arises from Congress’s
authority under Article I to ‘‘make rules for the Army
and the Navy.’’ Additionally, Article 36 of the UCMJ
permits the president to prescribe ‘‘pretrial, trial, and
post-trial procedures, including modes of proof,’’ for
courts-martial and military commissions. An executive
order containing the president’s prescripts is published
as the Manual for Courts-Martial (MCM).
As the military justice system is a creature of statute,
the Bill of Rights does not automatically apply; the rights
of military members are principally defined by Congress
in the UCMJ. Often these statutory rights exceed those
provided by the Constitution in the civilian setting.
Article 31 of the UCMJ, for example, mandates advise-
ment of rights against self-incrimination anytime a crim-
inal offense is suspected, whereas the civilian Miranda
rights apply only to custodial situations. Moreover, mili-
tary defendants are always entitled to free legal counsel
whether indigent or not.
TYPES OF COURTS-MARTIAL
The UCMJ provides for three types of courts-martial:
summary, special, and general courts-martial. Unlike their
civilian counterparts, military courts are differentiated
mainly by the severity of sentences they are authorized to
impose.
Summary courts-martial, which are composed of a
single officer who need not be a military judge, may
impose sentences of confinement that cannot exceed
thirty days, along with reduction in rank, and forfei-
ture of pay. Special courts-martial are additionally
empowered to impose sentences that include confine-
ment for a period of up to one year and a bad-
conduct discharge (upon enlisted members only). A
bad-conduct discharge is an unfavorable characteriza-
tion of service, which can impinge upon veterans
benefits to which the service member would have
otherwise been entitled.
A general court-martial can impose any sentence
authorized up to and including death. In addition, it
is the only type of court-martial that can impose a
dishonorable discharge upon enlisted personnel, and
its legal equivalent for officers, a dismissal. Persons
receiving a dishonorable discharge or a dismissal are
precluded by law from receiving almost all veterans’
benefits.
The military justice system has been updated and
revised several times since 1951. In the Military Justice
Act of 1968, Congress amended the UCMJ to require
military judges. In 1984 the Federal Rules of Evidence
were repurposed with very few adjustments as the
Military Rules of Evidence and mandated for courts-
martial. Twenty-first-century military trials are quite
similar in their legal content to those conducted in
federal courts for civilians.
DIFFERENCES BETWEEN CIVIL AND MILITARY
COURTS
There are two significant differences between military
trials and civilian trials. The Fifth Amendment of the
US Constitution specifically exempts the armed forces
from the requirement of a grand jury indictment. In
addition, the UCMJ does not provide for juries that are
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coterminous with those contemplated by the Sixth
Amendment for Article III civilian courts.
The military equivalent to a jury is a panel normally
composed of officers but may include enlisted personnel
if the accused is enlisted and he or she requests enlisted
membership on the panel. Special courts-martial must
have at least three members, whereas general courts-
martial must have at least five, except in the death
penalty cases, where there must be twelve members.
An accused may also request a trial by military judge
alone.
As in civilian trials, the accused is presumed inno-
cent until guilt is proven beyond a reasonable doubt. If
convicted, the accused is also given a sentence determined
by the panel or, in the case of a bench trial, the military
judge alone (except in death penalty cases, which must be
adjudicated by a panel).
Although military courts were once limited to trying
offenses with a military connection, the UCMJ essen-
tially grants jurisdiction to the military to try a military
member for any offense, even those without an obvious
service connection. In 1987 the Supreme Court in Solario
v. United States, 83 US 435 (1987), upheld the UCMJ’s
jurisdictional scope. Civilians, however, are generally not
subject to military trials.
The military justice system also provides for adminis-
trative disciplinary proceedings under Article 15 of the
UCMJ. These are limited by statute to ‘‘minor offenses’’
and are primarily aimed at rehabilitating the offender for
further military service. Penalties include forfeitures of pay
for up to two months, correctional custody for up to thirty
days, reduction in rank, and an administrative reprimand.
Court-martial cases may be appealed to a panel of
military judges that each service maintains. Further
appeal may be had to the Court of Appeals for the Armed
Forces, an Article I tribunal composed entirely of civilian
judges appointed by the president and confirmed by the
Senate. Appeal to the Supreme Court by certiorari is also
possible.
Questions continue about the appropriate role of the
military commander. Although forbidden to influence
the outcome of cases, the military commander has
authority to determine what charges, if any, are prose-
cuted, and the military commanders selects the court-
martial panel.
Publicity surrounding reports of sexual assaults in
the armed forces has resulted in statutory changes in the
characterization of sexual offenses and the procedures
applicable to them.
SEE ALSO Ex parte Milligan; Hamdi v. Rumsfeld;
Martial Law.
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MILLENNIAL GENERATION
Millennials, born from 1982 through 2003, are the larg-
est and most diverse generation in American history. In
2015 there were about ninety-five million Millennials in
the United States, compared to seventy-eight million
Baby Boomers and sixty-eight million Generation Xers.
In their classic work on generational analysis, William
Strauss and Neil Howe (1991) label the Millennial gen-
eration as ‘‘civic.’’ Civic generations tend to be reared by
their parents in a positive, protected, and structured
manner that usually leads to group-oriented, optimistic
offspring. As with all generational cohorts, the attitudes
and behaviors of Millennials have also been strongly
shaped by the major societal crises of their childhood
and formative years—in their case, the September 11,
2001, terrorist attacks and the great recession that
began in 2008. As adults, Millennials, like civic gen-
erations before them, are likely to be broadly unified
in their major beliefs and institution builders.
WHO THEY ARE AND HOW
THEY GOT THAT WAY
About 40 percent of Millennials are nonwhite, compared
to only about 25 percent in the two previous generations,
Gen Xers and Boomers. This diversity has contributed to
the generation’s group orientation and desire to find
broadly beneficial solutions to societal problems. Reflect-
ing those civic beliefs, the share of Millennial college
graduates who believe their community is more impor-
tant than their job doubled between 1982, when a young
Generation X answered the question, and 2008, when
Millennials did. That represents the single largest shift in
basic values among young people on any measure during
that period.
Perhaps the most important shaper of the attitudes
and values of Millennials was their parents’ approach to
raising children. The primary goal of parents of Millen-
nials was to build up their children’s sense of self-esteem
so that the hard knocks they would inevitably experience
Millennial Generation
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